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Abstract 
In this work, we present four different implementations of a run-time monitoring framework suited to real-timeand 
safety critical systems. Two implementations are writtenin Ada and follow the Ravenscar profile, which make 
themparticularly suited to the development of high integrity systems.The first version is available as a standalone 
library for Adaprograms while the second has been integrated in the GNATrun-time environment and instruments 
the ORK+ micro-kernel.Information on the task scheduling events, directly originatingfrom the kernel, can thus be 
used by the monitors to check ifthe system follows all its requirements. The third implementationis a standalone 
library written in C++ that can be used inany POSIX compliant run-time environment. It is thereforecompatible with 
the vast majority of operating systems usedin embedded systems. The last implementation is a loadablekernel 
module for Linux. It has for main advantage to be ableto enforce complete space partitioning between the 
monitors andthe monitored applications. It is therefore impossible for memoryfaults to propagate and corrupt the 
state of the monitors. 
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Abstract—In this work, we present four different implementa-
tions of a run-time monitoring framework suited to real-time
and safety critical systems. Two implementations are written
in Ada and follow the Ravenscar profile, which make them
particularly suited to the development of high integrity systems.
The first version is available as a standalone library for Ada
programs while the second has been integrated in the GNAT
run-time environment and instruments the ORK+ micro-kernel.
Information on the task scheduling events, directly originating
from the kernel, can thus be used by the monitors to check if
the system follows all its requirements. The third implementation
is a standalone library written in C++ that can be used in
any POSIX compliant run-time environment. It is therefore
compatible with the vast majority of operating systems used
in embedded systems. The last implementation is a loadable
kernel module for Linux. It has for main advantage to be able
to enforce complete space partitioning between the monitors and
the monitored applications. It is therefore impossible for memory
faults to propagate and corrupt the state of the monitors.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a part of the development process of embedded systems,
there is a need to verify that the functional and timing
requirements defined in the system specifications will always
be respected after the system deployment. This is even more
important for safety critical systems, which must go through
a thorough certification process. However, with the increasing
complexity of embedded systems, it becomes always more
complicated and sometimes impossible to statically verify
offline that all the requirements will be respected at run-time.
Specifically, with the advent of multicore processors, several
new challenges arose: (i) the manufacturers sacrificed the de-
terminism of their computing platforms to improve the average
case performances, (ii) the number of applications running
concurrently on the same processor and hence competing for
the shared resources, is increased, (iii) the applications are
becoming more complex and make use of intra-task paral-
lelism to take advantage of the processing power offered by
the several cores. Additionally, the integration of applications
developed by different companies or development teams, the
utilisation of legacy code and/or the lack of access to the
source code of some of the executed functionalities, render
the verification process even more complex.
Under such conditions, it becomes unrealistic to formally
verify that all the system requirements will be respected under
any possible execution scenario. The worst-case analyses that
are usually performed before the system deployment are also
based on a set of assumptions (e.g., minimum activation
period, worst-case execution time, maximum release jitter)
that may not always be respected at run-time. For all those
reasons, run-time monitoring and run-time verification become
an interesting alternative to the traditional offline verification.
Run-time verification is based on the instrumentation of the
target applications. Monitors are then added to the system to
verify at run-time that the system requirements are respected
during the execution. If a misbehaviour is detected, an alarm
can be raised so as to trigger appropriate counter-measures
(e.g., execution mode change, reset or deactivation of some of
the functionalities).
Run-time monitoring and verification can be used during the
system development phase to test and debug the applications.
However, the monitors can also be left in the system after its
deployment, in which case they play the role of a safety net,
preventing the system to enter in an unexpected or dangerous
state.
Safety related standards recommend the use of run-time
monitoring and verification solutions in safety critical systems
[1]–[3]. However, their use is not limited to safety critical
applications. They can be very useful for the development of
mission critical and business critical applications, or simply to
improve the reliability of any embedded system.
II. REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
In [4], a reference architecture for a safe and reliable run-
time monitoring framework was proposed. This architecture is
depicted on Figure 1. It is based on four main components: (i)
event buffers in which events (i.e., a timestamp associated to a
data) can be pushed by the instrumented application, (ii) event
writers used by the monitored application to push events in the
buffers, (iii) event readers that may be used by the monitors
to access the events that are saved in the buffers, and (iv)
monitors, implemented as periodic tasks, that read events and
check that the application respect its specifications.
As shown on Figure 1, there can be only one writer per
buffer. This avoids parallel accesses to the same buffer, which
may have lead to unwanted blocking times. Thanks to this
restriction, the writing operation in a buffer is wait free. There
can however be more than one reader connected to the same
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Fig. 1. Run-time monitoring reference architecture [4].
buffer, which allows several monitors to use the same events
in parallel.
III. IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR DIFFERENT EXECUTION
ENVIRONMENTS
Four different implementations of the reference architecture
proposed in [4] have been developed and should be presented
during the demo session.
A. Ravenscar Compliant Ada Library
The first implementation is written in Ada, a programming
language particularly suited to the development of critical
applications. The library respects all the restrictions associated
with the Ada Ravenscar profile [5]. The Ravenscar profile
was defined to ensure timing predictability and hence ease
the timing analysis of critical applications, by enforcing strict
coding rules.
The developed library can be used in any application written
in Ada (Ravenscar compliant or not). It provides all the needed
facilities to instantiate monitors, buffers, buffer readers and
writers discussed above.
B. Integration in the ORK+ Micro-Kernel
ORK+ is a Ravenscar compliant micro-kernel [6] imple-
mented in Ada and integrated in the GNAT GPL 2011 compi-
lation system developed by AdaCore. The kernel is packaged
together with the compiler and the other libraries proposed
by the GNAT runtime environment. ORK+ is currently one
of the reference run-time environments in the ESA EagleEye
reference mission [7] used for testing new technologies for
future space applications.
The Ada library mentioned in the previous section was
added to the GNAT runtime environment and has been used to
instrument the ORK+ micro-kernel. This means that monitors
can now have access to task scheduling related events extracted
directly at the kernel level. Those events are saved in a set
of predefined buffers that can be accessed by user-defined
monitors.
C. POSIX Compliant C++ Library
The third implementation is written C++ and assumes a
POSIX execution environment. It can thus be used in a vast
majority of real-time operating systems available for embed-
ded applications (e.g., Linux, RTEMS, ...). Similarly to the
Ada library, the C++ version offers all the facilities required
for the implementation of an efficient run-time verification
framework compliant with the reference architecture described
in Section II. Each monitor is encapsulated in a POSIX thread
which is periodically executed.
D. Integration in Linux as a Kernel Module
In addition to the POSIX implementation, a loadable kernel
module has been implemented for Linux. The major advan-
tage of this Linux implementation is that it achieves total
space partitioning. Indeed, the monitors can be instantiated
in different processes than the monitored application. As each
process runs within its own virtual sandbox, it is impossible
for a monitor or a monitored application generating memory
errors to corrupt monitors instantiated in other processes.
Additionally, the buffers are living at the kernel level while
the monitors and monitored applications are instantiated at
the user level. Given that the event buffers are allocated in
kernel memory, they cannot be corrupted, and will persist
even if the monitored application crashes, thereby allowing
the monitors to continue extracting critical information even
when the system malfunctions. Finally, kernel land allows for
finer-grained control over the hardware. The preemptions can
thus be disabled during critical sections, guaranteeing wait-
free read and write operations in the buffers.
IV. DEMONSTRATION
During the demo session, we will (i) show how applications
running in the different execution environments described in
the previous section can easily be instrumented, (ii) show how
monitors can be implemented either for logging, for runtime
verification purposes or for providing adaptive capabilities to
the instrumented application, (iii) provide indications on the
impact of the framework on the application performances.
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